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Date: 2002-06-15
Keyrings: "Crypto can backfire"
Weil es angesichts der Auffassungen über und Praktiken mit Kryptographieprogrammen einfach nicht oft genug gesagt werden kann: Die Daten , die man unter Umständen verrät, sind eventuell wertvoller, als jene, die man dadurch schützt.
Das posting stammt von der internen GILC-list.
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On 14 Jun 2002 at 14:24, zoltan.galantai wrote:
> wouldn't it be possible to combine the campaign against the data > redention law with a campaign to promote the idea of the secure > communication (i.e. GPG.) Or: could we begin a crypto campaign paralel > with it?
Dear Zoltan and all,
Crypto will help absolutely nothing against data retention and it would be a grave mistake in communicating this.
What they do is data mining and creating "communciation trees". If they [cops, agencies] e.g., get hold of the data on the server that is running gilc-plan, they would do a few tricks to create certain statistics:
average frequency of posting per member who creates the longest subject-threads Who usually answers whom in posting How uses which Internet provider where Who uses a fix IP-Adress and who a dialup-connection Which office e-mail adresses turn up
c & c
Then they would match those datasets with others they would have. Who of gilc-plan members is active on other public civil liberties related mailing lists, whose name also appears on webites and in news articles in what kind of context.
Further breakdown:
Match data with those of the the iata-database [world wide flights passengers list] that is open to at least the spook agencies of the G8 and most of the western world. Spooks would even get our personal customers profiles from the various customer relationship management databases of the carriers.
Next step would be "additional value" to those already detailed datasets: matching theme with national [online] phone directories.
Any spy agency would know very much about your communications and whereabouts, Zoltan, without even contacting their hungarian colleagues at International Law Enforcement Academy in Hungary that has almost certainly no ties to the FBI und even less to the CIA ;))
http://www.usis.hu/ilea.htm
If there is crypto in use the way internet user groups practice encryption, writing in clear name, using keys with bundles of digital signatures [rings of trust], the agencies get information of a very high value. They would know who trusts whom, who are the persons trusted by most & c & c.
Crypto can backfire, especially when it's possible value is overestimated. cu Erich
- ----------------------- Taeglich frische IT-Nachrichten http://futurezone.orf.at
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edited by Harkank
published on: 2002-06-15
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